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Chapter IV
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND POVERTY:
LESSONS FROM ASIA AND AFRICA
1
By John Cockburn, Bernard Decaluwé and Véronique Robichaud
Introduction
In recent years, the impacts of macroeconomic shocks, such as fiscal reform and
trade liberalization, on income distribution and poverty have become the subject of intense
debate.  Which tax regime is most equitable?  Do the poor share in the gains from freer
trade?  What alternative or accompanying policies could be used to ensure a more equitable
distribution?  What are the mechanisms linking macro policies to micro impacts, particularly
with regard to poverty.
The standard story begins with the observation that initial tariff rates are generally
much higher for industrial imports, so that trade liberalization leads to an expansion in the
agricultural sector that provides relatively greater benefits for unskilled workers and rural
households  than  for  capital  owners  and  urban  households.    The  results  of  this  study
challenge the standard story in important ways.  Most importantly, trade liberalization was
found  to  favour  urban  households  in  general  and  actually  lead  to  an  increase  in  rural
poverty in four of the seven countries analyzed.  The explanations for these results reveal
a number of unexpected channels of impact through which trade liberalization influences
these economies and, ultimately, poverty.
The analyses of macroeconomic shocks and poverty are generally based on very
different  techniques  and  sources  of  data.    Income  distribution  and  poverty  issues  are
generally analyzed based on household data, in recognition of the heterogeneity of these
agents and the importance of capturing their full distribution.  On the other hand, given its
economy-wide nature and the strong general equilibrium effects they imply, macroeconomic
shocks are ideally examined in the context of a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model based on national accounting data.  The use of a CGE model is also justified by the
complexity of the impacts of trade liberalization on households, as they involve changes in
wage rates, returns to land, capital returns, consumption prices and compensatory direct
and  indirect  taxes.    Finally,  CGE  simulation  analysis  has  the  advantage  over  ex  post
econometric analysis of generating a counterfactual in the absence of trade liberalization
as well as of allowing ex ante predictions.
1 This paper was prepared with funding from the Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) Research
Network, financed by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).104
This study melds these two currents.  Average household income variations following
trade  liberalization  were  estimated  at  the  household  category  level  in  CGE  models  of
seven Asian and African countries:  Bangladesh, Benin, India, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines
and Senegal.  These variations were then applied to individual households within each
category, using base-year income data from household surveys.  These results were then
contrasted  with  initial  income  values  through  the  estimation  of  standard  Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indicators.
Underlying individual country studies were all conducted by local researchers in the
context of the PEP-MIMAP research network.
2 The differences between these countries
provide a natural laboratory to understand better the impact of trade liberalization on the
poor.  The economy-wide modelling framework adopted in this study allows the principal
channels of influence to be identified and compared.  Every effort was made to ensure the
comparability of the modelling frameworks in each country to ensure that all observed
differences reflected actual differences rather than differences of approach.
A.  Brief literature review
There have been numerous attempts to use CGE models in the analysis of income
distribution  and  poverty  issues.
3 The simplest approach is to increase the number of
categories of households.  In this context, it is possible to examine how different types of
households (rural vs. urban, landholders vs. sharecroppers, region A vs. region B etc.) are
affected by a given shock.  However, nothing can be said about the relative impacts on
households within any given category as the model only generates information on the
representative (or “average”) household.  There is increasing evidence that households
within a given category may be affected quite differently according to their factor endowments,
location, demographics, education, consumption patterns etc.  Of course, this problem of
intra-category variation decreases with the degree of disaggregation of household categories.
Yet even in the most disaggregate versions – Piggott and Whalley (1985) have more than
100  household  categories  –  substantial  intra-category  heterogeneity  in  the  impacts  of
a given shock is likely to subsist.
A popular alternative is to assume a lognormal distribution of income within each
category where the variance is estimated using base year data (see De Janvry and others,
1991).  In this approach, the CGE model is used to estimate the change in the average
income for each household category, while the variance of this income is assumed to be
fixed.    Decaluwé  and  others  (1999)  argued  that  a  beta  distribution  was  preferable  as,
unlike the lognormal, it could be skewed left or right and thus better represent the different
types of intra-category income distributions commonly observed.  Here, no specific functional
form is imposed on the distribution function.  Instead, the income variation obtained for
2 Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) research network:  www.pep-net.org and Micro Impacts of
Macro and Adjustment Policies (MIMAP) Project:  www.mimap.org.
3 A detailed review of the CGE literature on the welfare, poverty and distributional effects of trade
liberalization is provided by Cloutier, Cockburn and Decaluwé (2003).105
each household category in the CGE model simulation is applied to the income of each
individual  household  belonging  to  this  category.    This  provides  a  vector  of  household
incomes before and after the trade liberalization simulation on which a standard poverty
analysis can be performed.
A final alternative, currently pursued by the members of this research network, is to
model  each  household  individually  in  a  micro-simulation  model.    This  micro-simulation
model can be either linked to a CGE model (Savard, 2003) or fully integrated into a CGE
model (Cockburn, 2001; Cogneau and Robilliard, 2001).
Section B tracks the effects of trade liberalization through the economies studied in
order to explain the welfare poverty results.  In particular, the authors trace the channels of
impact on sectoral production and trade, factor prices, household income and consumer
prices  before  revisiting  the  welfare  and  poverty  analysis  in  the  light  of  the  preceding
results.  Throughout, the authors draw a series of lessons, many of which contrast with the
standard trade liberalization-poverty story outlined in the introduction.  Section C provides
concluding remarks.
B.  Simulation results
The standard expectations for the impacts of trade liberalization on poverty are as
follows.  First, as initial tariffs are generally higher for industrial goods, it is expected that
the agricultural sector will be the main beneficiary of trade liberalization.  This, in turn,
raises the relative returns to factors used intensively in the agricultural sector – unskilled
labour and land.  Rural and poor households, which derive a relatively large share of their
income from these two factors, should therefore be the “winners” from trade liberalization
in  income  terms.    On  the  other  hand,  consumer  prices  are  expected  to  fall  more  for
industrial goods, which is to the advantage of rich and urban households.  The net effects
on poverty will depend on the relative strength of the income and consumer price effects,
although it is generally assumed that the income effect will dominate and the poor will thus
benefit.  The results of the authors’ simulations in these seven quite different developing
countries challenge these expectations in a number of important ways.
1.  Welfare and poverty impacts
Lesson one:  Trade liberalization increases welfare and reduces poverty marginally
The results of this study indicated that trade liberalization has positive, although
generally small, aggregate welfare and poverty effects in most of the countries studied
(table 1).  Note that welfare indicators concern all households, whereas poverty indicators
compare the income of the poorest households with a minimum income required to satisfy
their  basic  necessities.    Overall  welfare  effects,  as  measured  by  equivalent  variations
(EV), are generally small but positive, with the exception of Benin (-0.3 per cent) and India
(-0.1 per cent).106
At the same time, poverty falls in all countries but Bangladesh, regardless of the
poverty indicator chosen.  Headcount ratios (P
0) fall substantially in Benin (-1.02 per cent)
and moderately in all other countries, except for Bangladesh (0.13 per cent).  Similar, if
sometimes stronger, reductions are noted in the poverty gap (P
1) and poverty severity (P
2),
the  latter  decreasing  by  2.19  per  cent  in  Senegal.    The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is
devoted to explaining this and the following lesson.
Lesson two:  Trade liberalization is pro-urban and may increase rural poverty
Trade liberalization affects rural and urban households quite differently.  In every
country, apart from Nepal and Senegal, welfare increases and poverty decreases most for
urban  households.    This  contrasts  with  the  standard  story,  which  suggests  that  rural
households will be the “winners” from tariff reductions.  Indeed, welfare actually decreases
and poverty increases in the rural areas of four (Bangladesh, Benin, India and Pakistan) of
Table 1.  Impact on income, welfare and poverty
(Unit:  %)









Bangladesh -3.1 -2.7 -2.8 0.1 0.13 0.53 0.71 0.418 0.099 0.034
Rural -3.2 -2.9 -2.8 -0.1 0.10 0.53 0.71 0.461 0.109 0.038
Urban -3.1 -2.5 -2.9 0.4 0.46 0.53 0.67 0.204 0.047 0.016
Benin -4.2 -3.1 -3.2 -0.3 -1.02 -1.00 -1.23 0.354 0.110 0.050
Rural -5.5 -5.2 -2.4 -3.0 2.38 3.12 3.76 0.389 0.109 0.043
Urban -3.1 -1.1 -4.1 2.0 -4.92 -4.84 -4.86 0.320 0.110 0.056
India -9.7 -9.2 -9.1 -0.1 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 0.383 0.133 0.064
Rural -9.8 -9.8 -9.1 -0.2 0.00 0.27 0.32 0.404 0.134 0.062
Urban -9.5 -9.0 -9.1 0.1 -0.14 -0.27 -0.31 0.376 0.133 0.065
Nepal -5.9 -5.0 -5.2 0.0 -0.74 -0.43 -0.46 0.395 0.121 0.054
Rural -5.8 -5.0 -5.2 0.0 -0.83 -0.48 -0.53 0.377 0.107 0.045
Urban -6.4 -5.0 -5.2 0.0 0.00 -0.18 -0.23 0.636 0.302 0.176
Pakistan -6.7 -5.5 -5.7 0.3 -0.50 -0.55 -0.89 0.383 0.086 0.028
Rural -6.8 -6.4 -5.6 -0.8 1.70 2.78 3.19 0.372 0.081 0.026
Urban -6.6 -4.5 -5.8 1.3 -3.42 -4.64 -5.74 0.397 0.094 0.031
Philippines -3.0 -1.8 -2.5 0.8 -0.75 -1.47 -1.88 0.485 0.171 0.079
Rural -3.1 -2.1 -2.5 0.4 -0.56 -1.37 -1.79 0.632 0.228 0.107
Urban -2.9 -1.7 -2.5 0.9 -1.10 -1.68 -2.06 0.337 0.112 0.051
Senegal -3.7 -2.6 -3.1 0.3 -0.24 -1.49 -2.19 0.691 0.284 0.147
Rural -3.8 -1.6 -3.4 1.9 -0.49 -1.80 -2.48 0.884 0.401 0.218
Urban -3.7 -3.2 -2.9 -0.2 0.63 0.47 0.61 0.390 0.100 0.036
Notes: CTH = consumption; CPI = consumer price index; EV = equivalent variations; P
0 = headcount
ratio; P
1 = poverty gap; P
2 = poverty severity.107
the seven countries studied.  To understand these results more clearly, the impacts of
trade  liberalization  are  traced  below  through  its  effects  on  resource  allocation,  factor
remuneration and the price structure.
2.  Trade and output effects
Lesson three:  Industrial output increases relative to agriculture due to a stronger
export response and greater input cost savings
The pro-industrial nature of trade liberalization can be explained by three major
factors:    (a)  a  muted  impact  of  import  price  reductions  on  domestic  demand  for  local
products,  given  their  imperfect  substitutability  and  low  initial  import  penetration  rates;
(b) a stronger positive industrial export response; and (c) greater input cost savings in the
industrial sector.  These factors are outlined in more detail below.
The initial impact of trade liberalization is felt by imports.  The elimination of tariffs
directly reduces import prices (table 2).  In all seven countries, import prices decline more
in the industrial sector as a result of higher initial tariff rates.  Consequently, the import
response (a 1 per cent to 10 per cent increase) is higher among industrial imports in all the
countries studied.  As this response also depends on the degree to which imports and
domestic goods are considered as substitutes, which varies across countries, the increases
in import volumes are not necessarily proportional to the fall in import prices.  The smallest
import increase is observed in Nepal, where initial tariff rates are lowest.  In the case of
India, the strong industrial import response is also due to the elimination of quantitative
restrictions, whereas these restrictions had already been removed by the mid-1990s in the
other countries.
Table 2 shows that in the agricultural and industrial sectors, domestic demand for
locally produced goods (“dom.  sales”) declines in the face of lower-priced imports.  However,
imports represent on average less than 20 per cent of domestic consumption in all countries
and are considered imperfect substitutes for local goods; therefore, the resulting falls in
the price and volume of domestic sales of local goods are quite limited.  Although these
impacts are strongest in the industrial sector (except in the Philippines), the differences
with  regard  to  agriculture  are  generally  small.   A  particularly  strong  price  reduction  is
observed in India, where quantitative imports restrictions are simultaneously removed.
With  a  fixed  current  account  balance,  the  increase  in  imports  following  trade
liberalization leads to a real exchange rate depreciation.  This, in turn, stimulates exports.
The strength of this export response depends on the fall in prices for domestic sales, the
capacity  of  local  producers  to  substitute  between  local  and  export  markets,  the  price
elasticity of world demand for these exports
4 and initial export intensities.  As domestic
prices fall most and initial export intensities are highest in the industrial sector, this sector
generally has the strongest export response.
4 World demand for exports from Benin, Nepal, the Philippines and Senegal are assumed to be
perfectly elastic.108
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Initial shares and ratios.109
Indeed, this response is strong enough to counteract the reduction in domestic
sales such that total industrial output actually rises relative to total agricultural output in all
but one country (Benin).  Even there, the difference in output response is much smaller
than  the  difference  in  domestic  sales.   This  pro-industrial  “export-push”  effect  of  trade
liberalization is not often noted in studies of trade liberalization.  However, the combined
effect of fixed or falling export prices and falling prices for domestic sales is a fall in output
prices that hits the industrial sector slightly harder than the agricultural sector, except in
Benin and Nepal.
Given higher initial tariff rates and import penetration rates in the industrial sector,
consumer prices systematically decline much more than in the agricultural sector.
5 As the
industrial sector consumes a higher share of industrial inputs in most countries, it benefits
most from the resulting input cost savings of trade liberalization.  While industrial output
prices fall relative to agricultural output prices in five of the seven countries, value added
prices actually increase in the industrial sector relative to the agricultural sector in four
(Bangladesh, Nepal, Philippines and Senegal) of these seven countries.  This counteracting
input cost effect of trade liberalization on the relative value added prices of industry and
agriculture is another novel finding of this study.
This chapter now turns its attention to the impacts on the service sector.  Initial
tariffs on the limited or inexistent imports of services are all zero.  Consequently, where
there are any imports of services, their price remains constant and import values actually
decrease as consumers switch to cheaper agricultural and industrial goods.  Domestic
sales  decline  nonetheless,  albeit  much  less  than  in  agriculture  or  industry,  as  import
penetration ratios are small and real depreciation leads producers to increase their exports.
However, the net impact on the output and value added of services is generally small and
negative, except in Benin and Senegal, which have the two of three highest export intensities
for services.  Output and value added prices fall roughly in proportion with the agricultural
and industrial sector.
In conclusion, in most countries a similar pattern is observed concerning the trade
and output effects of trade liberalization.  Higher initial tariffs on industrial imports translate
into greater reductions in their import prices.  However, due to their imperfect substitutability
with regard to domestic goods and generally low import penetration ratios, the resulting
reductions in domestic output prices and volumes are much smaller.  Furthermore, due to
its high export intensity, the industrial sector benefits most from the resulting export expansion,
such that industrial output, with the exception of Benin, rises relative to agricultural output.
This pro-industrial impact is further reinforced by industry’s more substantial input cost
savings.  Finally, the service sector is characterized by generally small output effects, as it
has no initial tariffs.
5 This result is discussed further in subsection B6.110
3.  Factor price effects
This subsection shows how the general fall in value added prices affects factor
prices, which are the prime determinants of household income and, ultimately, poverty
effects.
Lesson four:  Relative wages increase, returns to capital fall
Perfect sectoral mobility of labour but no intersectoral mobility of capital is assumed.
6
Consequently, variations in capital prices differ from sector to sector, whereas variations in
wage rates are uniform.  The two exceptions here are Bangladesh and Benin, given that
these models distinguish numerous labour categories:  male and female low, medium and
high-skilled  workers  in  Bangladesh,  and  informal,  modern  and  civil  servants  in  Benin.
Thus, wage rate variations are weighted averages of the variations in the corresponding
wage rates of these labour categories, where the weights differ between sectors.
In general, the cost of mobile factors is expected to be less affected than the cost
of  fixed  factors.    The  more  rigid  the  market  for  a  factor,  the  greater  will  be  the  price
response and vice-versa.  Therefore, it is not surprising if a smaller fall is recorded in wage
rates than in capital prices.  Although the fall in average returns to capital is relatively
greater than in wages in most countries, sectoral impacts mimic changes in value added
prices.
Hence, sectors within which value added prices fall more will also show a greater
decline in the returns to capital.  The factor share in value added will determine the degree
to which the impact on value added price is transmitted to return to capital.  Finally, the
overall impact will depend on the sectoral share in overall factor payments.
In the models of India, Nepal and Senegal, land is distinguished.  In the case of
India and Nepal, constant relative agricultural prices lead to stability in the returns to land,
relative to the other factors of production.  In Senegal, returns to land fall relative to all
other factors, reflecting the stronger fall in agricultural value added relative prices in that
country.  In conclusion, with the exception of Nepal and Senegal (relative gain for capital),
trade liberalization leads to an increase in the relative price of labour.
4.  Household income effects
Lesson five:  Nominal income tends to fall most in rural areas
In the preceding subsection, nominal returns to all factors fall were seen to fall as
a result of trade liberalization.  Consequently, it is not surprising that nominal household
income also falls in all countries (table 4).  The fall is the greatest for countries where the
reductions in nominal factor returns are the strongest, i.e., India (-9.7 per cent), Pakistan
(-6.7 per cent) and Nepal (-5.9 per cent).  Conversely, nominal incomes are least affected
6 The long-term effects with capital mobility are examined later in this chapter.111
T
able 3.  Impact on factor prices
(Unit:  %)
Change in
Sectoral shares in factor payments*





































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.  Impact on income
(Unit:  %)
Change in rate Share in total income
Contribution to change
Country in income
Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All
Bangladesh 
Unskilled wage -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 36.5 12.0 24.2 -1.1 -0.4 -0.7
Skilled wage -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 18.4 22.3 20.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
Capital -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 43.7 59.6 51.7 -1.5 -2.0 -1.7
Other income 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 6.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL – – – 100.0 100.0 100.0 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1
Benin
Wage -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 79.0 47.4 61.5 -2.1 -1.3 -1.6
Capital -5.3 -5.3 -5.3 19.8 36.6 29.1 -1.1 -2.0 -1.5
Other income -1.9 0.0 -0.1 1.2 16.0 9.4 -2.4 0.1 -1.0
TOTAL – – – 100.0 100.0 100.0 -5.5 -3.1 -4.2
India
Wage -10.5 -10.5 -10.5 47.6 48.6 48.1 -4.7 -4.8 -4.7
Capital -10.6 -10.6 -10.6 21.3 40.8 30.0 -2.1 -4.1 -3.0
Land -10.5 -10.5 -10.5 20.4 0.3 11.5 -2.0 0.0 -1.1
Other income 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 10.2 10.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8
TOTAL – – – 100.0 100.0 100.0 -9.8 -9.5 -9.7
Nepal
Unskilled wage -6.1 -6.8 -6.2 22.6 14.8 21.4 -1.4 -1.0 -1.3
Skilled wage -6.1 -7.0 -6.4 8.4 23.0 10.6 -0.5 -1.6 -0.7
Capital -5.8 -7.2 -6.2 15.1 23.8 16.4 -0.9 -1.7 -1.0
Land -6.2 -5.9 -6.2 34.7 8.2 30.6 -2.1 -0.5 -1.9
Other income 0.0 -0.1 0.0 19.3 30.2 21.0 -0.9 -1.6 -1.0
TOTAL – – – 100.0 100.0 100.0 -5.8 -6.4 -5.9
Pakistan
Wage -6.4 -6.4 -6.4 53.1 34.0 42.8 -3.4 -2.2 -2.7
Capital -7.9 -7.9 -7.9 37.0 46.0 41.8 -2.9 -3.7 -3.3
Other income -0.1 0.0 0.0 9.9 20.1 15.3 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7
TOTAL – – – 100.0 100.0 100.0 -6.8 -6.6 -6.7
Philippines
Wage -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 48.4 53.2 51.6 -1.5 -1.6 -1.6
Capital -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 37.2 31.0 33.0 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0
Other income 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.4 15.8 15.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4
TOTAL – – – 100.0 100.0 100.0 -3.1 -2.9 -3.0
Senegal
Wage -3.9 -3.9 -3.9 22.4 55.4 48.4 -0.9 -2.1 -1.9
Capital -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 29.0 10.5 14.4 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5
Land -6.7 -6.7 -6.7 14.1 0.0 3.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.2
Other income 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.5 34.1 34.2 -1.0 -1.2 -1.2
Total – – – 100.0 100.0 100.0 -3.8 -3.7 -3.7113
by  trade  liberalization  in  the  Philippines  (-3  per  cent)  and  Bangladesh  (-3.1  per  cent),
where  factor  incomes  fall  the  least,  and  in  Senegal  (-3.7  per  cent)  where  fixed  “other
income” (inter-household transfers) is a major part of household income.
In all but Nepal, rural households experience a larger nominal income reduction
than  urban  households.    Thus,  it  is  concluded  that  trade  liberalization  tends  to  be
pro-urban or anti-rural.  Different explanations underlie this result, depending on the country
analyzed.  In Bangladesh, Benin, the Philippines and Pakistan, urban households are less
affected due to their greater reliance on relatively stable other (non-factor) income such as
government  transfers  and  domestic  or  foreign  remittances.    In  the  cases  of  India  and
Senegal, rural income losses can be traced primarily to the reduction in returns to land.
Finally, in the case of Nepal, the nominal income of urban households falls more than that
of their rural counterparts, as skilled wages, returns to capital and “other income” decline
more for urban households than for rural households.  These results follow the greater
price reductions in the service sector, which uses skilled labour and capital more intensively.
Once again, the use of full-scale realistic models has led to a surprising conclusion
concerning  the  important  positive  impact  of  non-factor  income  for  households  and  the
substantial negative impact of land income for rural households.  These two effects outweigh
the more traditional labour and capital-income share effects.
5.  Consumer price effects
Lesson  six:    Nominal  consumer  prices  fall  more  in  industry  than  agriculture  or
services
The  analysis  in  the  preceding  subsection  suggests  that  trade  liberalization  is
pro-urban in terms of its impacts on nominal income.  However, by reducing import prices
and local competing goods, trade liberalization may also substantially reduce consumer
prices.  These impacts may also differ between households according to their consumption
patterns.  It is the net impact of these income and consumer price effects that ultimately
determines the welfare and poverty impacts of trade liberalization.
Table 5 shows that consumer prices fall by only 3.4 per cent in Senegal but by as
much as 9.7 per cent in India as a result of trade liberalization.  In all countries, the fall in
consumer prices for industrial goods is substantially greater, 5.8 per cent to 10.9 per cent,
than for the agricultural and service sectors, reflecting high initial tariff rates and/or high
import penetration ratios in the industrial sector.
Lesson seven:  Cost of living effects vary
In all countries but Senegal, rural households devote a larger share of their total
consumption to agricultural goods than do their urban counterparts, whereas urban households
consume relatively more services.  It should be stressed that “industrial goods” are defined
very broadly here to include very simple food processing such as milled rice (23 per cent
of household consumption in Bangladesh).  Consequently, in most countries, rural households114
Table 5.  Impact on consumer prices
(Unit:  %)
Import




consumption change in CPI
consump-
sales tax Imports
sales sumer Rural Urban All Rural Urban All tion
Bangladesh 9.1 1.3 -13.3 -4.0 -3.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 -2.8 -2.9 -2.8
Agriculture 2.4 1.3 -8.1 -3.3 -2.1 16.8 14.1 15.5 -1.9 -1.8 -1.9
Industry 24.4 1.3 -13.6 -4.7 -5.8 55.1 36.2 46.2 -3.3 -4.0 -3.6
Services 0.0 1.3 – -3.9 -2.6 28.1 49.7 38.3 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3
Benin 19.6 3.8 -14.9 -5.4 -4.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 -2.4 -4.1 -3.2
Agriculture 2.7 3.8 -9.6 -4.8 -1.4 34.7 31.2 32.9 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
Industry 39.7 3.8 -15.8 -5.4 -7.0 51.8 39.8 45.6 -3.1 -7.6 -5.1
Services 3.3 3.8 0.0 -5.8 -2.6 13.5 29.1 21.5 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0
India 5.5 0.9 -14.6 -10.1 -9.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 -9.1 -9.1 -9.1
Agriculture 0.9 0.9 -11.0 -9.6 -8.9 42.6 29.2 37.1 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9
Industry 12.8 0.9 -15.8 -10.8 -10.9 26.2 27.2 26.6 -9.9 -9.6 -9.8
Services 1.2 0.9 0.0 -9.9 -9.0 31.2 43.5 36.3 -8.9 -8.9 -8.9
Nepal 15.4 1.1 -7.9 -5.8 -5.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2
Agriculture 5.5 1.1 -7.6 -6.0 -5.1 79.3 65.3 77.3 -5.1 -5.1 -5.1
Industry 54.4 1.1 -7.9 -5.9 -6.0 14.3 19.5 15.1 -6.1 -6.1 -6.1
Services 0.0 1.1 0.0 -5.6 -4.5 6.4 15.1 7.7 -4.3 -4.3 -4.3
Pakistan 11.6 2.7 -18.0 -7.9 -6.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 -5.6 -5.8 -5.7
Agriculture 3.4 2.7 -6.4 -6.6 -4.1 39.7 28.0 34.0 -4.1 -4.2 -4.2
Industry 24.3 2.7 -20.1 -8.6 -9.6 39.9 39.1 39.5 -7.5 -7.6 -7.5
Services 2.5 2.7 0.0 -7.9 -5.2 20.4 32.9 26.5 -5.0 -5.1 -5.1
Philippines 17.4 3.4 -16.2 -5.2 -4.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5
Agriculture 1.8 3.4 -7.0 -4.1 -0.9 14.6 9.8 11.4 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Industry 33.3 3.4 -18.0 -6.9 -8.2 52.1 40.6 44.4 -4.2 -5.3 -4.9
Services 4.6 3.4 0.0 -4.3 -0.9 33.3 49.6 44.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Senegal 19.7 3.1 -13.6 -4.1 -3.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 -3.4 -2.9 -3.1
Agriculture 14.8 3.1 -11.9 -3.1 -1.6 17.1 20.3 19.2 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Industry 26.9 3.1 -17.2 -4.8 -6.0 54.3 43.3 47.1 -5.6 -5.6 -5.6
Services 11.8 3.1 0.0 -3.7 -0.3 28.6 36.4 33.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
benefit less than urban households do from the fall in the relative consumer prices of
industrial goods, resulting in a smaller reduction in their consumer price indices.  In India,
Nepal  and  Pakistan,  rural  and  urban  households  consume  roughly  the  same  share  of
industrial goods.  Although rural households consume relatively more agricultural goods
and fewer services, consumer prices in these two sectors vary in roughly the same proportion;
thus, there is little urban-rural difference in the variation in consumer price indices.  Thus,
it can be said that trade liberalization is pro-urban in terms of income as well as consumption.
6.  Welfare and poverty effects revisited
Having now followed the channels of impact of trade liberalization through these
different  economies,  we  are  in  a  position  to  return  to  the  original  poverty  and  welfare
results to understand better the underlying mechanisms.  As mentioned above, there are
two main channels of impact linking trade liberalization to household welfare and poverty,115
i.e., income effects and consumer price effects.  To examine these effects, the income and
consumer price changes discussed in the preceding two subsections are reproduced in
the first two columns of table 1.  Total consumption of households is also reproduced since
the closure chosen in the models implies that household savings should vary to equilibrate
the investment-saving condition.
It becomes clear that the generally positive welfare effects of trade liberalization
can be explained by the fact that the reduction in consumer prices is greater than the fall
in total consumption, which accounts for the variation in income and savings.  It is also
noted  that  the  welfare  effects  of  trade  liberalization  favour  rural  households  over  their
urban counterparts only in Senegal.  This result, which occurs despite greater nominal
income reductions among rural households, can be attributed to the greater fall in total
consumption  for  urban  households.    In  this  model,  rural  savings  are  maintained  fixed.
Consequently, compensation for lower governmental saving must be entirely covered by
urban households.  In all the other countries, the higher decline in income is mirrored by
a  higher  decline  in  total  consumption.    Except  in  the  Philippines  and  Senegal,  urban
households therefore gain from trade liberalization whereas rural households experience
a slight reduction in welfare.  Urban welfare gains can be traced primarily to their greater
reliance on stable “other income” sources and their proportionately lower consumption of
agricultural goods, for which prices fall least.
Poverty reductions are greatest in Benin, although overall welfare declines slightly.
Gains in welfare thus principally reach the poorest households while losses are concentrated
among rich households.  In India, Nepal and Pakistan, poverty reductions are very small.
It is quite understandable in India, where welfare slightly decreases, and in Nepal, where
welfare gains are non-existent.  It suggests, in the case of Pakistan, that the welfare gains
from trade liberalization accrue primarily to richer households.
(a) Compensation mechanisms
Liberalizing trade implies a change (generally negative) in government revenue,
since tariff revenue represents a more or less important part of it.  Government income
being fixed, this revenue loss must be compensated for; the adjustment variable chosen
can influence the results.  The simulation described previously specifies a sales compensatory
tax, increasing by between 0.9 per cent in India and 3.8 per cent in Benin, which directly
affects consumption prices.  To understand this influence, the results of the same trade
liberalization  scenario  are  compared  using  another  compensation  mechanism  –  direct
compensatory tax on households’ income and a production tax.
(i) Direct compensatory tax
Using a direct compensatory tax does not significantly alter overall welfare, which
is still marginally positive in most countries.  Poverty, on the other hand, now increases –
even if marginally – instead of decreasing in most countries.  Moreover, rural and urban
relative gains are often changed and more definite than with a sales tax, except in India
where rural-urban difference in welfare variations is less important.  This is as expected,116
since a sales tax (mostly influencing resources allocation) compared with an income tax
(directly  influencing  household  welfare)  should  bring  more  equalized  results  if  income
taxation rates are considered to be more differentiated among households than are income
sources and consumption patterns.
In terms of allocation of resources, the same decrease in import prices (except in
India, where quotas are present) drives a higher demand for agricultural and industrial
imports (except for Benin’s industrial imports) since, without the sales tax, the import price
on the market is lower.  Qualitative results concerning exports, output and domestic prices
are unaffected by the compensation mechanism while, quantitatively, domestic and output
prices often decline more in industry and less in agriculture and services, and domestic
and output supplies increase more.  A notable difference is Bangladesh, where domestic
demand now increases by 0.7 per cent.  Interestingly, Nepal and Benin are more in line
with other countries in terms of agricultural vs. industrial magnitude of responses, indicating
that the sales tax has a significant impact in these countries.  In Nepal, this is explained by
the  extremely  small  difference  between  tariff  rates  (and  thus,  import  price  decline)  in
agriculture and industry while in Benin, it follows from the high level of the compensatory
tax.  Impacts on services go in the same direction but are generally weaker than with
a sales tax.
On  the  factor  market,  while  value  added  prices  do  not  follow  output  prices  as
closely, in general they still decrease.  Exceptions are Benin, the Philippines and Senegal,
where overall and some sectoral value added prices increase.  Being directly linked to
value added prices, wage rates decrease in every country except Benin, the Philippines
and Senegal.  Capital return generally exaggerates more than mirrors value added price
variation to compensate for the increase or insufficient decrease in wages, while a land
return decrease is diminished.  In other words, in the absence of a sales compensation
tax, returns to labour and service sector capital experience a higher relative gain because
of the lower decrease in value added prices.  Following changes in wage and return rates,
household incomes still decline (less than is the case with sales tax) in every country
except in Benin, the Philippines and Senegal, where wage rates increase.
The  disadvantage  to  rural  households  in  India,  the  Philippines  and  Senegal  is
again explained by changes in other income and in land returns that largely compensate
for wage rate benefits.  In all the other countries, a small relative income gain by rural
households is observed.  In other words, before-tax income changes are more equally
distributed than in the presence of a sales tax.  Consumer price variations are still negative
but stronger in most of the countries, as the fall in prices is not compensated by increased
indirect taxes.
Even if consumer prices decline more and incomes decline less, overall welfare
effect is still marginal since decline in total consumption (including changes in savings
and, especially, in direct tax) is more important, showing the significance of the compensation
mechanism.  Income tax increases significantly in Benin, Pakistan, the Philippines and
Senegal.  Highly taxed urban households in Benin, Senegal and the Philippines experience117
an especially significant decline in total consumption compared with the increase in income.
Despite  this  result,  and  mostly  because  of  significant  falls  in  consumer  prices,  urban
households still benefit more from trade liberalization than do their rural counterparts in
terms of welfare.  Households benefiting from a rise (decline) in welfare also benefit from
a decline (rise) in poverty.  Overall, poverty increases compare with trade liberalization
using sales tax compensation, but changes in overall poverty levels are marginal.  Compared
with the sales tax situation, urban-rural welfare and poverty effects are unchanged.
(ii) Production compensatory tax
When  using  a  production  tax  instead  of  a  sales  tax,  most  results  are  roughly
unchanged.  In effect, contrary to income tax, a production tax and sales tax both affect
the allocation of resources directly.  Therefore, the results also look much alike.
First, the decreases in import prices being the same, import demand, domestic
sales and prices as well as export and output responses are qualitatively and quantitatively
quite similar, as when a sales tax is used.  A pro-industry impact is maintained although
Benin and Nepal are still exceptions.  When using production tax, a significant difference
is the much more important decrease in output price.  In effect, this price includes the
production tax while the sales tax affects the consumption price although its value is not
included in it.  The services sector reaction is similar when using a production tax in all the
countries.
On the factor market, value added prices decrease roughly in the same proportion
as output and therefore decrease more than with a sales tax.  The industrial-agricultural is
inversed  in  five  of  the  seven  countries.
7 Consequently, the variation in the wage rates,
capital return and land return are also qualitatively similar but quantitatively more significant.
The relative gain to labour is maintained, again with the exception of Senegal.  This higher
fall in factor return brings a higher income loss for every household.  Rural-urban share of
this loss is similar.  The pro-urban income effect of trade liberalization, except in Nepal, is
therefore maintained in the presence of a production tax.  It is explained by the same
factors, except in the case of Nepal where the urban loss is principally linked to skilled
wages.  Consumer prices also decrease more in every sector and for every household in
the presence of a production tax, and the pro-rural consumption effect of trade liberalization
is maintained.
Income and consumer prices both decrease more but in similar proportions as,
with  a  sales  tax  compensation  mechanism,  impacts  on  welfare  and  poverty  are  quite
comparable.  Overall, welfare is still negligible and poverty generally falls.  Urban households
gain in welfare except in Nepal and Senegal.  As a result, urban poverty increases in
Senegal and Nepal.
7 Bangladesh, Benin, Nepal, the Philippines and Senegal.118
(b) Long term versus short term
Choosing to consider trade liberalization in a long- or short-term perspective can
lead to different conclusions.  In effect, capital mobility assumed in the long term allows
firms to react more adequately and to adapt to changes in the economic environment
more smoothly; capital goes where it is needed the most without creating artificial scarcity.
With this idea in mind, simulations of trade liberalization specifying capital mobility
are  compared  with  the  base  simulations  (using  the  three  compensatory  mechanisms)
where capital immobility is required.  Overall welfare and poverty results are basically the
same.  The sole exception is Nepal, where the relative position of rural and urban households
changes.  With sales and production compensatory taxes, rural (urban) Nepalese households
lose (gain) welfare in absolute terms while poverty decreases (increases) in relative terms,
when  capital  is  mobile;  however,  they  gain  (lose)  or  are  unaffected  when  capital  is
sector-specific.  With direct compensatory taxes, they become relative winners (losers).
Therefore, in every country, welfare and poverty results are slightly pro-urban in the presence
of sales and production taxes and are pro-rural in the presence of the income taxes, no
matter what time frame is used.
These results follow from the fact that mobility of capital allows both consumer
prices and income to decrease less than when capital is sector-specific, but in a more or
less similar proportion.  Income decreases less since capital is allowed to go into industry,
where demand is higher and then consequently competes less intensively with labour,
allowing the overall wage rate and the overall return rate on capital to drop by a smaller
amount.  An interesting case is Bangladesh, where both the wage rate and capital return
even increase, indicating that trade liberalization affects factors considerably, especially
capital demand.  Consumer prices decrease less since import price changes are the same
and domestic prices decrease less following the significant export push from the gain in
competitiveness permitted by mobile capital.
The  principal  exception  here  is  India,  where  both  income  and  consumer  prices
decrease more than in the reference simulation, but also have no differential impact in
terms of welfare and poverty.  In India, land return is highly affected by trade liberalization.
The positive capital return in agriculture due to the presence of land being replaced by
negative return rates (the same in every sector), combined with a still negative – in two
thirds of the cases, even more negative than with immobile capital – land return (land is
still specific to the agricultural sector), implies a important decrease in value added, output
and domestic as well as consumer prices in agriculture.  Consequently, both income and
consumer price index decrease more in the mobility case.  This effect is not as influential
in Nepal and Senegal, since the decrease in land return is not as important.119
C.  Conclusion
The authors note than because they are economists, it is perhaps not surprising
that the main conclusion drawn from this study of the impacts of trade liberalization on
poverty is that there is no general relationship between trade liberalization and poverty;
rather, the conclusion is that “it depends”.  As this detailed analysis based on disaggregated
large-scale CGE models shows, trade liberalization is more complicated than policymakers
may want to admit, with numerous complex and opposing impacts on these economies
that channel through the output, factor and product markets to influence household income
and consumer prices.  The main contribution of this chapter is to point out some general
trends as well as explain carefully on what factors the poverty impacts of trade liberalization
“depend”.
Nonetheless, it does appear that trade liberalization generally increases welfare
and reduces poverty marginally, although some categories of households and certainly
some specific households clearly lose out.  An almost clear conclusion emerges concerning
the rural-urban bias in the welfare and poverty impacts:  urban households gain in terms of
welfare and poverty, while rural households lose from trade liberalization.
When  the  channels  of  impacts  are  examined,  some  interesting  results  emerge.
Initial  tariffs  tend  to  be  higher  for  industrial  imports.    As  a  result,  trade  liberalization
generally reduces import, domestic and output prices of industrial goods with regard to
their agricultural and service counterparts.  The cases of Pakistan and India are interesting
in this regard, as they show how trade liberalization and ensuing export expansion may
lead to a greater fall in export prices where a country faces world demand that is not
perfectly elastic (i.e., demand for price reductions as exports increase).  However, greater
export  intensities  in  the  industrial  sector  imply  that  this  sector  benefits  more  from  the
ensuing export expansion, such that industrial output actually increases more than output
in the other two sectors in all but Benin.
Another remarkable result of the analysis is the importance of the input cost effects
of trade liberalization.  As each sector consumes a large share of inputs from within the
sector itself, the industrial sector – where price reductions are greatest – gains the most in
terms of cost reductions from trade.  Indeed, these cost savings are so strong that, in most
countries, value added prices actually fall less in the industrial sector than in the agriculture
sector.  However, it is the service sector, which is essentially cut off from international
trade, which often experiences the smallest reductions in value added price following the
removal of tariffs.  As value added prices determine factor remunerations, these results
have important welfare and poverty implications.
As labour’s principal source of income is the service sector, wage rates tend to fall
less than the returns to capital and land.  Conversely, the returns to land, where this factor
is explicitly taken into account, fall relative to the other factors given its tight links with the
agricultural  sector,  where  value  added  prices  decline  most.    Capital  is  assumed  to  be
sector-specific, so that the returns to capital in the service sector fall less than in the other
two sectors.120
Surprisingly, it is not the differences in the returns to the two principal factors of
production – labour and capital – that drive the household income results.  Instead, it is the
greater reliance of urban households on relatively stable non-factor income and the greater
reliance of rural households on the strongly falling returns to land that explain a general
pro-urban bias in the household income effects of trade liberalization.
The impacts of tariff removal on consumer prices also hold a few surprises.  Although
the  effects  are  about  the  same  for  both  types  of  households  in  most  countries,  rural
households consume relatively more agricultural goods, such that they benefit less from
the reduction in the prices of industrial goods than do urban households.  Finally, positive
welfare  and  poverty  effects  are  found  to  be  driven  by  consumer  price  reductions  that
outweigh the reductions in total consumption, with nominal income taking into account
variation  in  savings.    However,  it  should  be  noted  that  income  effects  may  dominate
consumer effects when looking at the rural-urban bias in specific countries.121
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DOES TRADE MITIGATE OR ENHANCE POVERTY?
By Mustafizur Rahman
When first reading the title of this session,
1 “Making trade work for poverty reduction:
Reality  or  fantasy?”  my  initial  response  was  that  the  answer  would  lie  somewhere  in
between.  Then I remembered the words of German philosopher Hegel:  “People generally
tend to think that the solution to a problem lies between two extremes; but between two
extremes lies not the solution, but the problem!”
Therefore, I would like to start by asking what type of trade and trading system we
are considering.  The answer to whether trade is poverty mitigating or poverty enhancing
will critically hinge on an answer to this question.
In answering the question posed in the theme, I would like to draw insights from
the Bangladesh experience.  I feel strongly that Bangladesh’s experience tends to epitomize
the  rewards  and  risks  as  well  as  the  opportunities  and  challenges  that  LDCs,  both  in
general and as a collective, face in the context of the multilateral trading system and WTO.
The  answer  to  the  question  posed  in  the  title  of  this  chapter  will  depend  on  how  the
attendant issues are addressed in the context of the multilateral trading system.
Before looking at the substantive issues, it should be recalled that global community
of  nations  have  jointly  agreed  to  help  the  developing  nations  attain  the  eight  MDGs,
including  MDG-1  which  mentions  halving  global  poverty  by  2015,  and  MDG-8,  which
aspires to make trade, together with debt relief and aid, work for attaining the other seven
MDGs.  Therefore, it is fair to argue that all countries have promised to work towards
making trade work for the advancement of the developing world.
It must also be kept in mind that the discussion of this theme is in the context of the
Doha  Development  Round;  in  particular,  let  us  not  forget  the  middle  ‘D’.   Thus,  while
discussing the power of trade to mitigate poverty and posing this issue as a question, it
must be remembered that we are discussing the issue of making trade work for poverty
alleviation in the context of a Round that prides itself for putting development at the centre
of the multilateral trading system.  Therefore, rather than asking whether making trade
work for poverty alleviation is a reality or a fantasy, the question should be what measures
need to be implemented in the context of the multilateral trading system in order to make
trade work for poverty alleviation.
Paraphrasing Marx, who said “so far philosophers have been engaged in explaining
the world; the task, however, is to change it”, our task should be to design a multilateral
trading system that is sensitive to the needs of poor nations and that addresses the needs
of poor people.
1 Refers to the “Post-Doha Research Agenda for Developing Countries” held in Macao, China on
30 and 31 October 2006.126
I will attempt to offer some insights by taking the experience of Bangladesh as
a test case.  In 1972, immediately after Bangladesh was born, a book was written that
subsequently became an important reference source.  In the preface of the book, entitled
Bangladesh:    a  Test  Case  for  Development,  the  authors  explained  that  the  newborn
country  was  beset  with  such  extraordinary  difficulties  in  managing  its  economy  that  it
would perhaps continue to remain predominantly aid-dependent for years to come.  Hence,
if development was possible in Bangladesh, it would be possible in all developing countries;
it was in that sense that Bangladesh became a test case for development.
This same Bangladesh could now be a test case, but in a context that is quite
different from the one mentioned in Bangladesh:  a Test Case for Development.
It should be noted that during the years since independence, Bangladesh has been
able to achieve a very crucial graduation, from a predominantly aid-receiving nation to
a  trading  nation.    Some  stylized  facts  will  help  explain  this  change.    In  early  1990s,
Bangladesh’s degree of openness was about 20 per cent, whereas it is now about 40 per
cent.    Bangladesh’s  export-to-aid  ratio  at  that  time  was  about  1:1;  in  financial  year
(FY) 2006, the ratio was 14:1.  In FY 2006 Bangladesh exported US$ 10 billion worth of
goods and US$ 4.2 billion worth of services (remittances).  In fact, US$ 14 billion worth of
exports of goods and services for a country with a GDP of about US$ 60 billion is a truly
noteworthy attainment – this is especially so for a country where the per capita income is
US$ 450 and the per capita export of goods and services income is about US$ 100.  With
export-oriented ready made garments (RMG) contributing 75 per cent of exports, Bangladesh
has, so far, successfully met the challenges emanating from the phase-out of the MFA
(in FY 2006, export growth of RMG was about 21 per cent).
In the decade of the 1990s, poverty was being reduced at a pace of 1 per cent per
annum.    The  signals  coming  from  the  data  generated  for  the  past  five  years  indicate
a doubling of the pace of poverty reduction.  Yet, about 40 per cent of the population
in Bangladesh is living below the poverty line.  There is growing inequality in income,
rural-urban inequality and spatial inequality are increasing and the number of people living
below the extreme poverty line is on the rise.
No doubt, income generated through export-oriented activities did have a positive
impact on Bangladesh’s economy and her achievements.  However, whether overall trade
liberalization  policy  has  achieved  a  positive  impact  on  poverty  alleviation  and  income
distribution has been questioned in the Bangladesh context.
Take the RMG sector, which accounts for 76 per cent of exports by Bangladesh.
The minimum wage fixed in 1994 was equivalent to US$ 30 per month.  In 2006, in the
face of worker agitation, the minimum wage was increased by 70 per cent; yet, it is now
actually equivalent to just US$ 27 per month and the workers are asking for US$ 40.
Entrepreneurs say that if they have to pay US$ 40 per month as a minimum wage they will
not survive in the global market.  Therefore, an LDC such as Bangladesh is able to export
to the global market only by giving less than US$ 1 a day to a worker, which is below the
international poverty line.  It therefore appears time to consider the way the multilateral127
trading system works, even for “successful” LDCs.  What is happening to terms of trade?
How to move up-market, ensure higher local value addition, increase productivity, enhance
product  diversification  and  strengthen  trade-related  capacity-building?    These  are  the
challenges that Bangladesh must meet.
It is in that context that a comprehensive aid-for-trade package in support of LDCs
becomes pertinent and vital.  While it cannot be denied that Bangladesh and other LDCs
will need to do their own necessary homework in order to address these challenges, it is
equally true that the rules of the multilateral trading system will also need to be suitably
fashioned to help the LDCs in this regard.  The developed countries will also need to
undertake necessary obligations in this respect.
An effective aid-for-trade package and greater market access for LDC products
(under a global zero tariff, zero quota market access) could be two measures for enabling
LDCs to take advantage of the current phase of globalization.
In terms of market access, the major offensive interest of LDCs in the context of
the Doha Development Round is the demand for duty-free-quota-free (DF-QF) access for
all  products  from  all  LDCs  in  the  markets  of  all  developed  countries.    However,
Annex 36(F) of the Hong Kong Declaration stipulates DF-QF access for only 97 per cent of
tariff lines, leaving scope for avoiding the provision of zero tariffs on exports of virtually
all products from LDCs to the United States market, which is the major market of interest
to the LDCs.
In  the  European  Union,  where  LDCs  receive  DF-QF  under  the  “Everything  but
Arms” initiative, the rules of origin continue to be stringent and only about 60 per cent of
Bangladesh’s exports can actually access the DF facility.  “Everything but Arms” provided
zero-tariff access to 919 agricultural items, but the lack of supply-side capacities means
LDCs cannot reap the potential benefits.
Even though LDCs were not asked to undertake commitments at the WTO Hong
Kong Ministerial Meeting, their export competitiveness will be negatively affected because
of preference erosion.  Market access to the United States would have positively offset the
negative impact of tariff erosion; but that did not happen at the Hong Kong Ministerial
Meeting.  In 2005, the import duties on Bangladesh’s exports to the United States amounted
to some US$ 420 million; this was several times higher than bilateral United States aid to
Bangladesh.   A  fund  created  from  such  import  duties  could  be  used  for  trade-related
support,  including  trade-related  capacity-building  in  LDCs.    Analysis  indicates  that
zero-tariff market access is likely to increase Bangladesh’s exports to the United States by
30 per cent.
All studies, including those by the World Bank, have shown that LDCs stand to
gain substantially from exports of services.  An International Monetary Fund study showed
that opening up even a 3 per cent labour service market in the developed countries would
bring about US$ 150 billion to developing countries and LDCs in remittances.  However,
as is widely known, there has not been any tangible progress in the negotiations on the128
temporary movement of natural persons under GATS mode-4.  The analysis of HIES data
in Bangladesh clearly shows a high correlation between poverty alleviation and household
earnings from remittances.  However, some 80 per cent of such remittances to Bangladesh
come from other developing countries.
The worsening terms of trade for products from Bangladesh is also not helping.
Compared with the mid-1990s, Bangladesh has seen a decline in the terms of trade index
from 100 to 86 in recent years.
The strengthening of S&DT provisions in WTO and more faithful implementation
are needed.  There is also a lack of harmonization between trade policies in WTO and aid
policies of development partners at home.  Even if WTO negotiations had carved out some
policy space for LDCs, they had to abandon using it under aid conditionalities imposed by
aid donors with negative implications for applying policy space to development objectives.
LDCs demand harmonization and alignment between WTO decisions and aid conditionalities.
The discussion of an aid-for-trade package in WTO is making good progress and
a number of good suggestions have been put forward.  However, LDCs have concerns in
that regard.  Will it be new money?  What will be the LDCs’ share?  Will conditionalities be
attached?  Will LDCs have a say in the allocation and use of those resources?  LDCs
would like to use aid-for-trade support for trade-related supply side capacity-building in
upgrading  the  growth  of  productivity  as  well  as  modernizing  ports  and  infrastructure
development, for supporting trade facilitation measures.
Bangladesh as a trade dependent LDC firmly believes that if the multilateral trading
system  and  its  rules  can  be  crafted  along  these  lines,  making  trade  work  for  poverty
reduction will indeed become a reality and no longer remain a fantasy.
Some of the research questions that could be asked in this context are:
• How to identify country-specific demands for the aid-for-trade package from
the perspective of poverty alleviation?
• How should trade policies be integrated in poverty reduction strategic plans
of LDCs?  (This will require the identification of the transmission mechanisms
of  the  gains  from  trade  as  well  as  how  to  ensure  that  poor  people  have
a share in the process.)
• Which services sector openings under node-4 will have the greatest poverty
alleviating impact?
• Under the ongoing GATS negotiations, LDCs are being asked to open up
services  sector  under  offer  and  request  modality.    Liberalization  of  which
services sectors will be beneficial from the perspective of poverty alleviation?